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GOD AND INFINITE HIERARCHIES 
OF CREATABLE WORLDS 
Bruce Langtry 
I argue that For every creatable world there is another one that is better than it does 
not entail There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being. 
An agent choosing which world is to be created from an infinite hierarchy of 
candidates should satisfice. For there are independent reasons for resisting 
the inferences from You have better reason to choose A than you have to choose B to 
You should choose A rather than B and to If you were to choose A rather than B then 
you would be acting in a morally better or more rational way. 
William L. Rowe's recent book Can God Be Free? advances what I will call 
'the Entailment Thesis': 
The proposition For every creatable world there is another one that is 
better than it entails the proposition There does not exist an omnipotent, 
omniscient and perfectly good being.1 
Section I deals with Rowe's arguments directly in favour of the Entailment 
Thesis. Section II investigates the content of the thesis. Section III argues 
against the thesis. Section IV anticipates how Rowe would respond to Sec-
tion III, and accordingly reinforces my main arguments. Section V raises a 
final difficulty for defences of the thesis. 
I. Rowe's Positive Arguments for the Entailment Thesis 
Rowe's main argument is that the thesis follows from the following propo-
sition, 'Principle B,' which he declares to be a necessary truth: 
If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it 
could create, then it would be possible for there to be a being morally 
better than it.2 
Rowe acknowledges that 'we are far from proving' Principle B,3 but offers 
two arguments in prima facie support of it. Here is the first: 
For if an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created 
a better world, then that being has done something less good than it 
could do (create a better world). But any being that knowingly does 
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something (all things considered) less good than it could do falls 
short of being the best possible being.4 
There is an important ambiguity in the expression 'do something less 
good than one could do.' Rowe's first premise can be understood in either 
of the following ways: 
(la) If an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created 
a better world, then that being has thereby performed an action 
that is less good-i.e., less morally good, less rational, or less a 
manifestation of excellence in acting-than an alternative action 
that the being could have performed 
(lb) If an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created 
a better world, then that being has thereby performed an action 
whose total causal consequences are less good than those of some 
alternative action that the being could have performed. 
(lb) is plausible; but to just about everyone except maximising act-conse-
quentialists, (la) will surely seem no less doubtful than Principle B itself, 
arid so cannot contribute to a strong argument for the principle. For ex-
ample, deontologists and rule-consequentialists will be able to envisage 
cases in which an omniscient being, given a choice of which of two candi-
date worlds is to be created, has a moral duty to choose the inferior world 
rather than the better one. 
Rowe's second premise can be understood in either of the following 
ways: 
(2a) Any being that knowingly performs an action that is less good-
i.e., less morally good, less rational, or less a manifestation of ex-
cellence in acting-than an alternative action that the being could 
perform falls short of being the best possible being. 
(2b) Any being that knowingly performs an action whose total caus-
al consequences are less good than those of some alternative ac-
tion that the being could perform falls short of being the best 
possible being. 
Here (2a) is plausible.s But unless we are already maximising act-conse-
quentialists, why should we regard (2b) as more secure than Principle 
B itself, and so an a good starting point for a persuasive argument for 
Principle B? As for maximising act-consequentialism, in Section V I will 
explain why it is far from clear that this doctrine can be used as a premise 
supporting (2b)-or (3a) or (3b), stated below-and thereby supporting 
Principle B. 
To sum up: (lb) and (2a) look initially plausible, but they do not jointly 
entail Principle B. It is plain that if we interpret Rowe's argument in such 
a way that it is free from equivocation with respect to the expression' do 
something less good than one could do,' and its premises jointly entail 
Principle B, then either (la) or (2b) requires a great deal to be said in its 
favour before most philosophers will be impressed by Rowe's argument 
for Principle B, and by the argument based on Principle B for the Entail-
ment Thesis. 
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Rowe discusses a number of major philosophers from Augustine 
onwards who have asserted that God always acts in accordance with 
what is best. But' act in accordance with what is best' is ambiguous be-
tween' act in the best way' and 'perform the action that has the best 
consequences.' Once we have noticed the ambiguity, it is hard to see that 
Rowe has identified, in the philosophers he discusses, any good argu-
ment in favour of the claim that God always performs the action with 
the best consequences. 
Rowe's discussion of the recent literature contains a second positive ar-
gument in direct support of the Entailment Thesis; it also constitutes an 
argument for Principle B. Here is the major premise: 
(3a) When the agent's motive in acting is to bring about a good state of 
affairs, the goodness of an action-measured in terms of the qual-
ity of its result-is expressive of the agent's goodness.6 
The context makes it clear that the goodness of an action and of an agent 
are to be understood as their moral goodness. But, so understood, the prin-
ciple is obviously false. An agent may be motivated by a desire to bring 
about a good state of affairs, and this desire may be fulfilled, but the moral 
goodness of the action, and of the agent, may diverge far from the quality 
of the result. For example, the quality of the result can vary with luck and 
with the interference of other people, without there being any variation of 
the moral goodness of either the action or the agent. 
Perhaps Rowe overlooks the foregoing points because he is thinking of 
an omnipotent and omniscient creator, who does not find the outcomes 
of her providential activity affected by luck or by the interference of other 
people. But it is hard to see how Rowe can obtain a good argument for the 
Entailment Thesis by somehow restating (3a) so as to get a premise with a 
more restricted scope. Consider, for instance: 
(3b) If an omnipotent and omniscient agent's motive in creating a 
world is to bring about a good state of affairs, then the degree of 
goodness of the world measures the degree to which the agent is 
morally good. 
Suppose that there exists a being G who is omnipotent, omniscient and 
moderately good, and consider two worlds V and W such that W is better 
than V but if G were to create W she would violate an important moral 
duty recognised by deontologists and rule utilitarians, while if she were 
to create V she would not violate any moral duty. It is true that even de-
ontologists and rule utilitarians admit that at least some moral duties are 
defeasible by considerations of utility. But why should they think that 
given that G, V, and Ware as described, we should conclude, as (3b) re-
quires us to conclude, that G's creating W would indicate her possession 
of a higher degree of moral goodness than would be indicated by her 
creating V? 
I hold that other things being equal, in intentionally bringing about the 
better state of affairs one acts in the better way, all-things-considered. In 
Section III I will argue that this true principle does not provide the basis 
for a good argument for the Entailment Thesis. 
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II. Refining the Entailment Thesis 
Inferring the Entailment Principle from Principle B requires the following 
auxiliary assumption, which I will call Creator: 
Necessarily, if there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly 
good being then it creates some world. 
Rowe argues in favour of Creator when he says: 'Given that it is better 
to create a world than not to create at all, God is doing the right thing in 
choosing to create a world rather than not to create at all.'7 Whether this 
argument is a strong one, and whether Creator is plausible, turn out to de-
pend on exactly how the word' create,' in such contexts as the Entailment 
Tbesis, Principle B and Creator, is to be understood. 
On p. 41 Rowe says that in creating a world God makes actual the con-
tingent states of affairs contained in that world. He then adds a footnote: 
Suppose God creates some living creatures who then create works 
of art. There being such works of art is a contingent state of affairs 
not directly created (made actual) by God. But these works of art 
would not exist had God not created living creatures. So, ultimately, 
all contingent states of affairs depend for their existence on God's 
creative activity. 
I suspect that Rowe is writing with indeterminism-indeed, with libertar-
ianism-in mind. If Rowe's argument from Principle B to the Entailment 
Thesis depended on the suppressed premise that necessarily if God exists 
then he causally determines every contingent state of affairs in whichever 
world is actual, then Rowe would certainly have realised this, and would 
have seen a need to highlight and defend such a controversial proposition. 
On one reading of the footnote, it expresses the view that if God creates 
a specific world then its constituent states of affairs stand in a variety of 
causal relations to God, but each one at the very least depends on God's 
activity, and so the world can be said, in a very broad sense, to be 'created' 
by him . 
.. If this broad sense of 'create' should be applied to the Entailment The-
sis and Principle B, then how about 'creatable'? Perhaps the suffix '-able' 
signifies the mere logical possibility that some person creates the world in 
question. If so, then here is a candidate logically necessary and sufficient 
condition of creatability: 
A world W is creatable if and only if in W there is some person on 
whose activity every contingent state of affairs is at least causally 
dependent.s 
(The expression 'every contingent state of affairs' has, in this and similar 
contexts, some 'basic exceptions' which I will usually leave unexpressed; 
they include P's existing (where P is the relevant person) and contingent 
states of affairs entailed by P's existing, if P's existing is contingent, and the 
truth of the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, if there are any.) 
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This proposal will not suit Rowe, because its adoption undermines the 
Entailment Thesis (and also undermines his arguments for the Entailment 
Thesis). For suppose that there are two worlds V and W such that (i) W is 
better than V, (ii) in each of them every contingent state of affairs depends 
on the activity of some omnipotent and omniscient agent G, but (iii) in W 
but not in V there occur certain specific states which while dependent on 
G are nevertheless uncaused by G. If V is actual then we have a situation 
in which G is omnipotent and omniscient, and 'creates' a world (according 
to the proposed account) even though there is a better' creatable' world. 
But since G could not have caused W to be actual, surely we should not 
infer that in this case G is not perfectly good. So why should we accept the 
Entailment Thesis? 
Plainly, Rowe needs an alternative account of creating and of creatabil-
ity which will enable him to retain the spirit, if not the letter, of the Entail-
ment Thesis as formulated in Can God be Free? 
Let us try to make further progress with such matters by using the famil-
iar expressions 'strongly actualise' and 'weakly actualise' to introduce the 
additional technical terms 'securely actualise' and 'securely actualisable' 
as candidate equivalents to the informal words' create' and' creatable'. 
A person G strongly actualises a state of affairs if and only if G causes 
and determines it to be actuaL G weakly actualises a state of affairs if G 
does not strongly actualise it and yet performs some action that both caus-
ally contributes to its occurrence and is such that, if G were to perform it 
then the state of affairs would be actual. G securely actualises a world if and 
only if either (a) G strongly or weakly actualises every contingent state 
of affairs included in the world or else (b) there are counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom true in the world and G strongly or weakly actualises 
every contingent state of affairs in the world except the obtaining of the 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.9 
Given the foregoing definition of 'securely actualises/ what meaning 
should be assigned to 'can securely actualise'? If 'can' is treated in this 
context as expressing logical possibility, then G can securely actualise W if 
and only if W contains the state of affairs G's securely actualising W 
Many philosophers, however, say that even if a person G is omnipotent, 
there is a sense, important for discussions of providence, in which what G 
'can' do is more limited than what it is logically possible for G to do. For 
example, Molinists declare that God's options are limited by contingent 
truths holding prior to his decisions. Of all the logically possible worlds 
in which both God exists and there are free creatures, God' can' securely 
actualise only some, and which ones they are depend on what counterfac-
tuals of creaturely freedom are true.lO 
Given that there are contingent limits to what an omnipotent agent can 
do, there are competing criteria of the agent's being able to do something. 
In some contexts, if you succeed in doing something by sheer fluke then 
this licenses the remark that you could do it. In other contexts, people will 
agree that that you can do something only if you meet certain standards 
of competence. In yet other contexts, we say that you can do something 
only if you are not only competent but you know that you have a suit-
able opportunity-e.g., there is a sense in which, however skilled you are, 
you cannot play the flute if no flute is within reach, or if a flute is within 
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reach but you do not know where to find it, or if other people will prevent 
you from playing if you try. This strong requirement for ascribing ability 
is obviously relevant to accounts of what omnipotence, omniscience and 
perfect goodness jointly imply, offered by theories recognising contingent 
constraints on the plans of an omnipotent being. 
Alongside the explanation of 'creates' and creatable' centred on depen-
dence, we now have a second proposal: a person G creates a world if and 
only if G securely actualises it, and a world is creatable if and only if some 
person can, relative to constraints obtaining in the acl.ual world, securely ac-
tualise itY Given this explanation, when Rowe says, in the footnote already 
quoted from his p. 41, that' all contingent states of affairs depend for their 
existence on God's creative activity,' the dependence relation he has in mind 
is that the contingent states of affairs are securely actualised by God.12 
Furthermore, there is a third proposal that should be taken seriously. 
Suppose that there is a world W which contains some contingent state 
of affairs F (not a counterfactual of creaturely freedom) such that it is logi-
C211ly possible that G securely actualise F, and which also contains Fs not 
being securely actualised by any being. It is logically impossible for G to se-
curely actualise W. Suppose in addition, however, that in W it is true that 
if G were to perform some action (or sequence of actions) A then F would 
probably obtain as a result. 13 Suppose that in W G does A, and doing A 
causally contributes to F's obtaining. Even though in W G does not se-
curely actualise W, if in W G securely actualises all contingent states of 
aJiairs other than F then there is a sense in which we can sensibly say that 
in W G weakly causes W to be actual. If, in the actual world, G can perform 
an action of the kind indicated, then G can weakly cause W to be actual. 
Thus we need to decide between three alternative interpretations of 
'creates' and' can create,' in terms of their suitability for Rowe's adoption 
in stating and defending the Entailment Thesis, Principle B and related 
propositions. Here are the three corresponding proposals for necessary 
and sufficient conditions of Person G creates world Wand Person G can 
cyeate world W: 
• G creates W if and only if W is actual and every state of affairs in-
cluded in W depends on G's activity. G can create W if and only if 
in W every state of affairs depends on G's activity. 
• G creates W if and only if W is actual and G securely actualises 
every state of affairs in W. Two alternatives concerning 'creatable': 
G can create W if and only if in W G securely actualises W. Alterna-
tively: G can create W if and only if in the actual world G possesses 
the power, skill and opportunity to create W. 
• G creates W if and only if W is actual and each state of affairs in-
cluded in W is either securely actualised or weakly caused to be 
actual by G. G can create W if and only if in W G creates W. Alterna-
tively: G can create W if and only if in the actual world G possesses 
the power, skill and opportunity to create W. 
Which interpretation of 'creates' is most suitable for Rowe's purposes? I 
have already indicated a serious difficulty with using the first when af-
'lrming and defending the Entailment Thesis. One reason to prefer the 
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third interpretation to the second is that the third makes the principle 
Creator-which Rowe needs in order to derive the Entailment Thesis 
from Principle B -look a lot more plausible than it would look under the 
second interpretation. For suppose there is some world W which G can 
weakly cause to be actual but not securely actualise, and which is better 
than any world that she can securely actualise. 14 Why should G not take 
steps aimed at weakly causing W to be actual, and succeed in actualising 
W, and thereby refrain from securely actualising any world? 
On the other hand, if Rowe were to adopt the third interpretation then 
Principle B, on which he relies so heavily, would be far from compelling. 
Suppose that in the actual world a there exists an omniscient agent G who 
has either securely actualised a or weakly caused it to be actual, and there 
is some non-actual world W which is better than a and which G can weak-
ly cause to be actual but cannot securely actualise. (Doubts about whether 
this supposition is logically possible would obviously provide other rea-
sons for rejecting the third interpretation.) It follows that an omniscient 
being G has created a world (namely, a) when there is a better world 
(namely, W) that G could have created. But why should we conclude that 
it is possible that there to be a being morally better than G? There is an ob-
vious possible explanation, consistent with moral perfection, for G's creat-
ing a (by securely actualising it or weakly causing it to be actual), rather 
than creating W (by weakly causing it to be actual instead): although W is 
better than a, the relevant probabilities are such that G's taking the steps 
she in fact took had a higher expected value than her taking the steps which 
would probably but not certainly have resulted in W (and there were no 
overriding reasons for reaching a contrary decision). 
It might be objected that talk of expected value is out of place when 
we are discussing decision-making of omniscient agents. Not so-at least, 
not unless it is logically necessary that if an omniscient agent exists then 
either determinism or Molinism is true. Suppose that God is omniscient 
and knows, timelessly or in advance, that he will weakly cause world a to 
be actual. There is an obvious circularity in the suggestion that God could 
rationally use this item of knowledge as part of his reason for resolving to 
weakly cause a to be actual.15 Hence even given that God is omniscient, 
his reasons for action will in some cases need to involve consideration 
of probabilities-unless either Molinism or determinism is true, in which 
case the second account of creating is to be preferred.16 
I conclude that Rowe faces severe difficulties whichever of the three 
accounts he adopts. Nevertheless the general drift of Can God Be Free? is 
plain enough: the second account, creating-as-securely-actualising, is the 
closest to what Rowe has in mind. Nowhere does Rowe discuss, or even 
acknowledge, the possibility that God's actions sometimes fail to achieve 
God's aims. Accordingly, in the rest of this paper I consider the Entailment 
Thesis under the second interpretation.17 
With the expressions 'securely actualise' and 'can securely actualise' 
in hand, I can introduce some more terminology that will prove useful 
later-especially in Section V. 
A hierarchy of a-securely actualisable worlds is a set S of worlds such 
that each member of S is commensurable with-i.e., either better 
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than, inferior to, or equal in value to-each other member, and in 
the actual world a there is some omnipotent and omniscient person 
G such that G can, relative to a, securely actualise any member of 
5, and there is no worJd outside 5 that is both commensurable with 
each member of 5 and which G can, relative to a, securely actualise. 
(From now on I will use' actualisable hierarchy' to abbreviate 'hierarchy of 
a-securely actualisable worlds', and, ignoring the possibility of G's weakly 
causing a world to be actual, I will use 'actualise' to abbreviate 'securely 
actualise'.) 
A world W is a prime member of an actualisable hierarchy H if and 
only W is a member of H and there is no better member. 
A world is prime if and only if it is a prime member of some actualis-
able hierarchy. 
There are three alternatives concerning what actualisable hierarchies 
there are: 
• there is none that has a prime member 
• they all have at least one prime member 
• some of them have at least one prime member and others do not 
The first of these alternatives is equivalent to There are no prime worlds. 
III. An Attack on the Entailment Thesis 
I am now construing the Entailment Thesis as saying that the proposition 
There are no prime worlds entails the proposition There does not exist an om-
nipotent, omniscient Ilnd perfectly good being. 
If there are no prime worlds, and an omniscient being actualises a 
world, then she actualises a world when she could have actualised a better 
one. Rowe thinks that in this case she performs an action that is less good 
than a relevant alternative action that she can perform, and therefore falls 
short of being the best possible being. 
I deny Rowe's claim. It is logically necessary if there is an omnipotent, 
omniscient and perfectly good being then she cannot act in a morally better 
way, or in a way that is better all-things-considered, or more rationally, than 
she in fact acts. If there are no prime worlds, then what follows is that in ev-
ery actualisable hierarchy there are infinitely many pairs of worlds V and W 
such that both W is better than V and an omnipotent and omniscient being 
can actualise W, but her achlalising W need not be a morally better action, 
or better all-things-considered, or more rational, than her achlalising V. 
Other things being equal, in intentionally bringing about the better 
state of affairs one acts in the better way, all-things-considered. Neverthe-
less there are certain situations in which the inference from The agent could 
have selected a better world to be actualised to The agent could have acted in a 
better way is defeated. One defeater consists of the conjunction of the fol-
lowing three conditions: 
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• for every world that could have been selected there is a better one 
that could have been selected, and 
• the world that was in fact selected is good enough relative to the 
foregoing circumstances, and 
• failure to select any world would have led to an outcome that was 
far inferior to each of the worlds that is good enough. 
Alongside issues concerning God's choices if there are no prime worlds, 
there is puzzle concerning rational, self-interested choice. Suppose that a 
superior being offers to prolong your life for a finite number of good days, 
with the number of days to be chosen by you, without restriction on how 
many days you may pick. Rational decision theory can reasonably be re-
quired to advise you about what you should do in the foregoing situation. 
It is tempting to argue: For any number of days, N, that you might 
obtain, you would be better off if you obtained N+ 1 instead. So for any 
N, you have better reason to select N+ 1 instead. So you would be acting 
more rationally if you selected N+ 1 than if you selected N. So you should 
not select N. This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the obvious 
truth that you should select some number, rather than walk away from 
the offer. 
You should satisfice-that is, choose a number that will secure an out-
come that is good enough. ls Indeed, you are rationally required to do so. 
Satisficing will lead to a better outcome for you than failing to satisfice. 
Nevertheless satisficing involves choosing an outcome despite the fact 
that there is an alternative available outcome given which you would be 
better off. 
It might be objected: When a policy is rationally required, and there 
are various rationally permissible ways of implementing it, some of these 
ways can be more rational than others. Even though it is more rational to 
satisfice than to fail to satisfice, and therefore there are some numbers that 
it is rationally permissible for you to choose, for each such number N it 
remains more rational for you to satisfice by choosing N+ 1 than to satisfice 
by choosing N. 
Decision theory provides demands (including prohibitions), recom-
mendations, and assessments (including comparisons) of rationality. 
These must fit together harmoniously. Specifically, our decision theory: 
(Cl) should not both recommend, of each of several candidate actions, 
that it be not performed, and also recommend that there be one of 
these actions that is performed, and 
(C2) should recommend that an action be not performed if the theory 
identifies some rival action (or refraining from action) as more 
rational, and 
(C3) should recommend (and, indeed, demand) that an action be per-
formed if the theory identifies the action as rationally required. 
The objector violates at least one of these conditions of theoretical co-
herence. Her theory evidently identifies, for each available choice of the 
number of days, at least one rival choice as more rational. According to 
condition (C2), her theory should therefore recommend, for each available 
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choice of number, that you not make it. But her theory admits that satisfic-
ing, i.e., making one of the available choices, is rationally required, and so 
according to (C3) it should recommend that you make one of them. But 
these two recommendations jointly violate (C1). 
You are rationally required to select some finite number of days. Our 
decision theory should affirm this. It follows, via (C3), that our decision 
theory should recommend that you select some finite number of days. No 
doubt it will add some supplementary recommendations-e.g., that the 
number selected should be greater than any number of days you have a 
reasonable expectation of living even if you decline the superior being's 
offer. Let us call any number tllat fulfils this and similar clauses' admis-
sible'. According to (C1), if our theory should recommend that you select 
some admissible number of days, then it should not recommend of each 
admissible number, that you not select that number; in which case, we can 
infer, via (C2) that our theory should not, for every admissible number, 
identify at least one other number (e.g., the number's successor) as one 
which it would have been more rational to select. 
I conclude that there is at least one admissible number N such that N it 
is not more rational to select N+ 1 instead, even though, ex hypothesi, you 
will be better off if you select N+ 1 than if you select N. 
The foregoing problem has as an ethical variant. Suppose that you are 
a child's guardian, and have a moral obligation to act in her interests. A 
superior being offers to prolong the child's life for a finite number of good 
days, with the number of days to be chosen by you. What should you do? 
An argument similar to the one above leads to the conclusion that, mor-
ally speaking, you should satisfice for the sake of the child. 
We should not respond to the problem of how an omnipotent and om-
niscient being should choose when there are no prime worlds by conclud-
ing that There are no prime worlds entails There is no omnipotent, omniscient 
and perfectly good being. Drawing that conclusion would provide no way 
out of the underlying ethical problem, which is raised equally by an who 
is limited in knowledge and power, and who mayor may not be morally 
perfect, but is faced with an infinite hierarchy of better and better states 
of affairs that she can decide will be brought about. What moral demands 
and recommendations does our well-developed moral theory issue to 
EUch an agent? What should it say about when her selecting a better state 
of affairs would be acting in a morally better way than her selecting a less 
good state of affairs? 
It should recommend that she satisfice, i.e., tl1at she select some good 
state of affairs even though she could select a better one. Therefore it 
should not also recommend, of each available good state of affairs, that 
she not select that one. Therefore it should not declare that, whichever 
state of affairs she selects, there is at least one alternative member of the 
hierarchy such that selecting it would be a morally better action. 
Some paragraphs ago, I claimed that when an agent is choosing a world 
to be actualised from an infinite hierarchy of better and better available 
worlds, the inference to the conclusion that whatever she did she could 
have acted in a better way is defeated. An objection was stated: that how-
ever good the world chosen, the agent would always have chosen better by 
choosing a better candidate. We are now in a position to identify where the 
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objection goes wrong. We should resist the inference from 'If the agent had 
chosen W instead of V then she would have chosen a better world' to 'If the 
agent had chosen W instead of V then she would have chosen better.' 
IV Standards for Satisficing 
In Can God Be Free? Rowe responds to an earlier version of the line of rea-
soning advanced in Section I1L19 He focuses on my original claim, modi-
fied above, that in the scenario in which there are no prime worlds the 
conclusion that God could have acted in a morally better way is defeated 
by the fact that some worlds are good enough. He applies pressure to the 
idea that some worlds are good enough.20 
Rowe observes that in my view whether or not a particular world is 
good enough for God to actualise is not an intrinsic feature of the world, 
but is relative to the range of options God faces. He complains that I seem, 
wrongly, to think that it is obvious just what worlds are acceptable for ac-
tualisation, relative to the choice situation in which for every world that 
could have been selected there is a better one. So I should now say more 
about this non-obvious matter. 
Let us try to get some clues by returning to rational, self-interested 
choice in response to the superior being's offer to prolong your life. Plainly 
if you were to choose the number 1 you would be choosing irrationally. 
You should satisfice by picking a number that is high enough. But when is 
a number high enough, relative to this choice situation? 
The superior being's offer assures you of the opportunity to live a finite, 
long and good life. In the absence of any further information about your 
future, what fuzzy minimum length of life will be required to enable you 
to live a life which, taken as a complete whole, instantiates your values, 
your ideals, to a high degree? It depends on what these values and ideals 
are, both before and after you have received the superior being's offer; and 
it also depends on what you count as a high degree. Let us suppose that 
your conception of a good life involves a wide range of goods functioning 
together in a harmonious and well-rounded way. If you die tomorrow then 
you know that your life will have a regrettable lack of balance: not only 
will major current aims and hopes be frustrated, and lots of loose ends 
be left lying around, but, more significantly, some of your most heart-felt 
values applicable to an individual human life will be unrealised. Perhaps, 
for example, you think it important that a person does all that she can to 
overcome estrangement from family and old friends, but you have not 
yet done so. Presumably there will be some range such that any number 
of days within the range will fulfill the following condition: although it 
would be better for you if you lived even longer, a life that falls within the 
range is not in consequence flawed, deficient or disappointing, relative to 
your deepest values and ideals for the shape and content of your life. In 
that case, if you choose a number that is considerably above the bottom 
of the range-about a thousand times those near the bottom, say-then 
surely you have satisficed wiselyY 
Why 'surely'? Because decision theory should not yield the consequence 
that a wise choice is impossible in the sihlation supposed. Given this as-
sumption, some such criterion as the one I have sketched is required. 
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So what counts as a world that is good enough, relative to the task of a 
person who is to decide which world will be actualised, out of an infinite 
range of better and better worlds? As I have already pointed out, we need 
not assume that the chooser is perfectly good. The issue concerns what 
our moral theory tells her about which of the available worlds are such 
that she would be choosing in a morally better way if she selected one of 
the others, and which of the available worlds are not. If there are worlds in 
the latter group, then they are the ones that are said, in the present context, 
to be good enough. 
What answer our moral theory gives will depend on its assumptions 
about value. Suppose, for instance, that it identifies the basic value states 
in any world as all consisting in a person's feelings of pleasure or dis-
pleasure during a short unit interval of time, measures their value simply 
by the intensity of the feelings, and declares that the value of a world 
is the sum of the values of the states. In that case there seems to be no 
principled way of identifying, amongst the worlds that have positive net 
value, some that are good enough. But a theory of the foregoing kind is 
very implausible. 
So suppose instead that our moral theory embodies the assumption 
that worlds are to be ranked chiefly by the extent to which they include 
many large communities of people characterised by justice, a rich culture, 
and fellowship between individuals each of whose lives embodies a wide 
range of goods functioning well together. A theory of this kind is likely 
to support the judgment that there are worlds such that, whether or not 
there are even better worlds, they are not flawed, deficient or disappoint-
ing relative to the values that underlie the ranking of worlds. (From now, 
for brevity's sake, on I'll just say '(non-)disappointing'; the other adjec-
tives should be regarded as tacitly present.) Such judgments fit in with 
a much wider array of judgments of quality-e.g., we can regard a meal 
cooked by a friend as very good, without inquiring into what a 5-star res-
taurant chef would have succeeded in doing with similar raw meat and 
vegetables; we can rate the first performance of a new piano sonata as 
wonderful, without listening to other performances of it by pianists of 
higher repute. 
How good does a world have to be to be good enough, relative to the 
choice situation specified? Here is a sufficient condition: when an agent is 
selecting a world to be actualised from an infinite hierarchy of better and 
better candidates, a world is good enough if it is non-disappointing in the 
light of the values that underlie the ranking of worlds, and moreover is 
abundantly better than those worlds that only just barely escape the ac-
cusation that they are disappointing.22 
Can God Be Free? yields grounds for thinking that Rowe would object to 
the last few paragraphs, along the following lines?3 Let us compare two 
hypothetical agents Alice and Beryl, each of whom is faced with the task 
of selecting a world to be actualised from an infinite hierarchy of better 
Clnd better candidates, and each of whom adopts the following policy: 
I will satisfice, and moreover I will choose in a great-hearted manner, 
and so select a world that is abundantly better than any world that is 
just barely non-disappointing. 
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The difference between Beryl and Alice is that Beryl rules out of further 
consideration worlds that Alice is quite prepared to regard as living op-
tions, because Beryl has a much higher standard than Alice of what is 
required by great-heartedness, and of what should count as being abun-
dantly better than the minimally and near-minimally non-disappointing. 
Surely, the objector declares in support of Rowe, our moral theory 
should deliver the verdict that in virtue of Beryl's higher standards and 
the accompanying choice-disposition, Beryl has a better moral character 
than Alice, and furthermore, given that Alice's choice of a world is classi-
fied as morally inferior by what we ourselves describe as the highcr moral 
standards of Beryl, we should regard Alice's choice of a world as mor-
ally inferior to various alternative choices. The example can be reiterated, 
since for every possible agent there will be another who has much higher 
standards pertaining great-heartedness, and of what should count as be-
ing abundantly-better-than-barely non-disappointing. Hence for every 
possible agent faced with the task of selecting a world to be actualised 
from an infinite hierarchy of better and better candidates, there is another 
possible agent who faced with a similar task who makes a morally better 
choice and who has a better moral character. Hence the account given in 
Section III is mistaken. 
Here is some parallel reasoning concerning self-interested choice in 
the longevity example. Suppose that you have chosen a number of days. 
Someone now alleges that your standards of what counts as a non-disap-
pointing life, and the dispositions which have led you to hold those stan-
dards, have led to a less rational choice of a number of days than alterna-
tive standards and dispositions that you might have possessed, and reflect 
a less rational practical intellect. Indeed, it is alleged, not only has this 
in fact happened: it had to happen, because whatever specific standards 
you might have held, there would have been others which it would have 
been more rational to hold. Hence, even if relative to those standards you 
actually hold your choice of number of days was at least as rational as any 
other, your choice was not, all-thing-considcred, as rational as a choice of 
this or that larger number would have been. 
It is plain that there is an error somewhere here. As I argued back in 
Section III, the view that for every number there is another number which 
it is more rational for you to choose should be recognised (in the light of 
plausible general principles of decision theory) to be inconsistent with the 
manifest truth that, having received the superior being's offer, practical 
reason requires you to choose some number. Hence the last sentence of 
the preceding paragraph, and so the reasoning that led up to it, should 
be rejected. 
But where, specifically, does the reasoning go wrong? Well for one thing, 
it is far from clear that there is indeed an infinite series of standards of a 
non-disappointing life that it is more and more rational for you to hold, 
as the objector in the longevity example assumes. Similarly, in the case of 
choice between worlds, it is far from clear that there is an infinite series of 
standards of a minimally good enough world, that are not only higher and 
higher in the sense of more and more demanding but are also such that, 
other things being equal, a person who holds a higher standard has a mor-
ally better character than a person who adopts a lower standard. 
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Instead of developing this point further, I will move straight on to the 
question: relative to the premise that there is indeed such an infinite series 
of standards, what recommendations do our decision theory and value 
theory jointly deliver about which standards you should have hold? 
They should at least recommend that choosers adopt (or re-affirm) some 
standards of what counts as a non-disappointing life and of what counts 
as a good enough world, and cultivate some relevant dispositions, rather 
than, say, choosing at random or in accordance with whatever disposi-
tions the choosers happen to find themselves with. If the objector were to 
suggest the contrary, then she would not be entitled also to make her vari-
ous moral claims about Alice, Beryl and other agents. 
(Cl) and (C2), in Section III, make it plain that our decision theory 
and value theory should not recommend of each available standard that 
you not hold it, and of each available disposition that you not cultivate it. 
Hence, given they should not, for every available standard, say that there 
is at least one alternative which it would be more rational, or better-all-
th; ngs-considered, to hold. 
I can now safely re-affirm my own conclusions about satisficing by di-
vine and non-divine choosers. 
V. Hierarchies with Prime Members and Hierarchies without Them 
Aithough my main criticisms of the Entailment Thesis are now complete, 
it is worth drawing attention to one other consideration that Rowe should 
find awkward. It becomes apparent in the context of the supposition, 
which Rowe would find it hard to rule out, that an omnipotent and om-
niscient agent G is faced with some actualisable hierarchies containing 
prime members, and some actualisable hierarchies without them. 
Let V be a prime member of some actualisable hierarchy, and let W be a 
good member of some hierarchy that lacks prime worlds. Surely G will be 
indifferent between actualising V and instead actualising W. After all, V is 
incommensurable with W. 
It might be objected that if G actualises W then she acts in such a way 
that she has better reason for actualising some other world instead, where-
as if she actualises V then this is not the case. Now I agree that in general 
if some world W* is better than W then this constitutes a reason for actu-
alising W* instead of W. But in the context of G's specific overall choice 
situation, W* is better than W does not entail G has better reasons, all-things-
considered, for actual ising W*; my grounds for saying this are that it follows 
from the truth, for which I argued in Section III, that in this context W* is 
better than W does not entail It would be more rational, all-things-considered, to 
actualise W. Hence the first premise of the objection is erroneous. G should 
indeed be indifferent between actualising V and actualising W. 
An especially interesting point emerges from the previous paragraph. 
Rowe is committed to saying that G's being morally perfect is compatible 
with G's actualising V but is incompatible with G's actualising W. Hence 
Rowe is committed to the view that G should rank actual ising V higher 
amongst her options than actual ising W, even though V and W themselves 
are incommensurable in value. Plainly, this view is incompatible with 
maximising act-consequentialism. 
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Hence given the assumption that some actualisable hierarchies con-
tain prime members and some do not, Rowe cannot invoke the truth of 
maximising act-consequentialism in any argument he might appeal to in 
direct support of Principle B, or in support of (2b) or (3a).24 Moreover the 
view that an agent may rank one candidate action higher than another 
even though their respective total causal consequences are incommensu-
rable is incompatible with both Rowe's (3a), which constitutes the major 
premise of Rowe's second argument in direct support of the Entailment 
Thesis (and also for Principle B). I do not see how Rowe can rule out its 
being true that some actualisable hierarchies contain prime members and 
some do not.25 
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NOTES 
1. William 1. Rowe, Can God Be Free? Oxford University Press 2004, p. 92. 
Rowe uses 'world' to mean 'possible world,' and on pp. 40-41 he proposes that 
a world be thought of not as a whole consisting of created objects such as trees, 
rivers and minds, but instead as' a maximal state of affairs W such that for any 
state of affairs either it or its negation is included in W.' I concur. 'Creation' 
therefore pertains not only to bringing into existence things like stars, rivers and 
humans, but also to providential control of what happens to things. 
2. Ibid., p. 97. 
3. Ibid., p. 121 
4. Ibid., p. 89, 120£. Consider the proposition that even if for every creat-
able world there is one that surpasses it in goodness, an omnipotent, omni-
scient agent's failure to create an unsurpassed creatable world constitutes a 
fault that shows that the agent herself is not unsurpassably good. Remarks 
on pp. 104ff indicate that Rowe is not asserting this proposition. Instead, he is 
saying that an omnipotent, omniscient agent's creating a world when there is 
a better one that she could create shows that she is not unsurpassably good. 
S. Construed uncharitably, (2a) implies that if there is a best possible be-
ing then each of her actions - including trivial ones like brushing one's teeth-
has an equal degree of moral goodness to each other action. I assume that a 
more charitable interpretation can be devised. Similarly with respect to (2b). 
6. Ibid., p. 100. I am not quoting Rowe; rather, the proposition sums up 
what he says over several sentences. 
7. Ibid., p. 111; cf. p. 92 
8. This formulation preserves the idea that being created is being (at least) 
dependent, and also relies on the point that if a world's fulfilling a specified 
condition is itself included in the world then it is logically possible that the 
world fulfils the condition. 
9. Clauses (a) and (b) tacitly involve the basic exceptions which I men-
tioned earlier. I am using the dummy name 'e' instead of the word 'God' in 
order to avoid assuming that necessarily if a being securely actualises a world 
then that being is God. That assumption would require support by a lot of 
metaphysical argument which should be bypassed here. 
10. Molinism is a theory of divine knowledge and providence, and their 
relation to human freewill, explained in Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowl-
edge, ed. A. J. Freddoso, Cornell University Press 1988 
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11. Sharpening this account would require elaborate investigation of the 
identity and role of background circumstances relative to which a specific 
'can' statement is true. But a more precise explanation is not needed here. 
12. If so, and if Rowe is a libertarian, then Rowe holds that if God exists 
then Molinism is true. 
13. Let action A have two components: strongly actualising the laws of 
nature, some of which are probabilistic rather than deterministic, and strongly 
actualising all other relevant states of affairs occurring before F. It is in virtue 
of the probabilistic laws that F can be said to be physically probable given A. 
14. This supposition is consistent with there being an infinite series of bet-
ter and better worlds that G can securely actualise. After all, 2 is greater than 
any member of the series 1/2, 2/3, 3/4 ... , even though the series ascends for-
ever. 
15. William Hasker makes essentially this point in his Providence, Evil and 
the Openness of God, Routledge 2004, pp. 104f. Let me expand the argument. 
If God is timelessly or at all times omniscient, then there is no place for non-
metaphorical talk of his deliberating about whether to causally contribute to 
the occurrence of some event, as if this is somehow an open question. But we 
can still speak of God's timeless or everlastingly past reasons for action. These 
reasons for action cannot include the premise that God will in fact causally 
contribute to the event. So what can they include? Perhaps counterfactual con-
ditionals, concerning what would happen if God were to act in such-and-such 
ways. But unless either Molinism or determinism is true, the only relevant 
true counterfactual conditionals are probabilistic ones. One way of employing 
probability estimates is as inputs to calculations of expected value. 
16. Rowe, as shown on pp. 125, 135 of his book, believes that worlds have 
quantitative values. Even if he is mistaken on this point, it may still in some 
cases be possible to compare worlds' values in quantitative terms, and thereby 
to provide for a sense in which the expected value of weakly causing one spe-
c:lfic world to be actual can be estimated as greater than the expected values 
for other worlds. This is most apparent in cases where two worlds differ only 
in some very simple, measurable, value-relevant respect. 
17. Given the second interpretation, we should not believe that Creator is 
trivially true, on the grounds that to refrain from bringing about anything is 
in this context to bring about something. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing proposition: If God were to refrain from bringing into existence any physical 
universe, thell a physical universe might well corne into existence anyway. If this 
proposition were true, then God's refraining from bringing into existence any 
physical objects, finite minds etc., together with any positive actions he did 
perform, would not amount to his securely actualising some world. It might 
be objected that the italicised proposition is logically impossible. Even so, it is 
not a trivial truth that it is logically impossible. 
18. 'Satisfice' is a technical term from decision theory and economics. I say 
more about satisficing in Section 4. 
19. The earlier version was contained my article 'God and the Best,' Faith 
Imd Philosophy 13 (1996), pp. 311-28. Rowe's discussion of the article is on pp. 
121-27 of his book. 
20. Rowe, op. cit., pp. 124-26 
21. I have, of course, been assuming that there are no time intervals within 
which the value of your life decreases as its length increases. 
22. On his p. 125, Rowe considers a being who creates a world WlOO from 
an infinite series of increasingly better worlds. Such a being, Rowe says, could 
instead have created a being a billion times better than W100. Surely there 
might be a being whose goodness simply would not let him create W100 when 
there was this superior alternative option. If so, then the being who creates 
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W100 is not absolutely perfect. The last few paragraphs form the basis for a 
reply to Rowe. Furthermore, it is at best very risky to assume that if an agent 
faces an infinite hierarchy of better and better actualisable worlds then in se-
lecting one world them she declines worlds a billion times better than the one 
she chooses. If there is an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds, it may 
nevertheless be that these worlds cannot sensibly be regarded as themselves 
possessing quantitative values, even fuzzy ones, and if the worlds do possess 
quantitative values, these values may converge on some finite limit. (Rowe 
ignores these epistemic possibilities when he says, on his p. 135: 'In the [in-
finite] series of increasingly better worlds ... each world logically could be 
better than a world below it by the same degree or amount.') In the former case, 
no world will be a billion times better than any other; in latter case, if the value 
of the selected world is close to the limit then it may be that no world is a bil-
lion times better than it. (Of course in either case some worlds may be a billion 
places above V in the ranking.) 
23. Cf. Rowe's response to Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder's views 
on his pp. 92-98, and his principle 1lI* and assumption A3, which he states 
on his pp. 115, 119 respectively and employs in his discussion of W. J. Wain-
wright's paper 'Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe and the Necessity of Cre-
ation' -Rowe's and Wainwright's pieces are both to be found in Jeff Jordan 
and Daniel Howard-Snyder, eds., Faith, Freedom and Rationality, Rowman & 
Littlefield 1996. 
24. I do not assert that Principle B entails act-consequentialism. Nor do 
I assert that Rowe himself is a maximising act-consequentialist. After all, he 
recognises the existence of supererogatory acts (Can God be Free? p. 82.) Of 
course it might be argued that my longevity example provides a strong objec-
tion all varieties of consequentialism that rank one action as better than an-
other if and only if its causal consequences are better overall. I need not press 
this suggestion here, but rest with the point that Rowe will have to work hard 
before he is in a position to use any such variety of consequentialism to lend 
plausibility to Principle B. 
25. I thank anonymous referees, and the editor of Faith and Philosophy, for 
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
